Government Subsidies and Political Elections: Evidence for Chile by Rodrigo Cerda & Rodrigo Vergara
Documento de Trabajo
ISSN (edición impresa) 0716-7334








www.economia.puc.clVersión impresa ISSN: 0716-7334 
Versión electrónica ISSN: 0717-7593 
 
 
PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE CHILE 
INSTITUTO DE ECONOMIA 
 
Oficina de Publicaciones 










  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL 
  ELECTIONS:  EVIDENCE FOR CHILE
* 
  
  Rodrigo A. Cerda
** 
 Rodrigo  Vergara
*** 
  












Santiago, Junio 2005 
 
                                                           
* We are grateful for comments received from participants in seminars at the Catholic University of 
Chile and at the Central Bank of Chile. We thank Elena Arzola for excellent research assistance. 
** Economics Department, Universidad Católica de Chile. Casilla 76, Correo 17, Santiago, Chile. 
(rcerda@faceapuc.cl). 














 ABSTRACT  1 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  1 
 
 
2.  A POLITICAL BACKGROUND  7 
 
 
3.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY  10 
 3.1.  Rough  correlations  10 
  3.2.  Data and preliminary results  13 
 
 
4. POTENTIAL  SIMULTANEITY  20 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  28 
 
 
REFERENCES   30 ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we explore the effects of government subsidies (monetary and in-kind) in 
presidential elections in Chile in 1989-2000. Our dependent variable is the percentage of 
votes obtained by the incumbent. We use a panel with three periods (the elections of 
1989, 1993 and 1999) and 228 counties. We correct for the potential simultaneity 
problem derived from the fact that an incumbent facing a difficult political scenario 
might react by increasing subsidies to improve his/her electoral performance. Our results 
indicate that the greater the government spending on these types of programs (measured 
by the percentage of the population that receives the subsidy), the higher the votes for 
the incumbent.  When we separate monetary and in-kind subsidies, we find that only in-
kind subsidies are statistically significant. We estimate that to obtain an additional vote, 
the incumbent has to spend between US$1,680 and US$1,920 (measured in PPP) in 
government subsidies. 
 
Keywords: political elections, subsidies, business cycle, unemployment. 





1.   INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly believed by the popular press and the public that in a political 
election, the incumbents are rewarded the greater the government spending is. Academic 
literature has also adopted this view and much of the theoretical work attempting to 
explain the distribution of federal funds assumes a model where the incumbent is 
rewarded the greater the amount of resources he or she obtains for his/her district.
1  
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence supporting this view has been rather mixed. 
Until the mid-1990’s, most of the evidence was not supportive of the idea that additional 
spending or employment yielded electoral benefits (see Feldman and Jondrow 1984, 
Stein and Bickers 1994). Moreover, Peltzman (1992) challenges this view and finds that  
                                                           
1 Weingast (1979), Niou and Ordershook (1985), Inman (1988), Inman and Fitts (1990). 2  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
the American voter is fiscally conservative. Using state-level election returns for 
presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial elections from 1950-88, he finds that voters 
penalize federal and state spending growth. This, of course, does not mean that for a 
given amount of total outlays, voters of a district prefer that the resources be spent in 
their community rather than elsewhere, but it challenges the general view that voters 
favor more government spending. 
In contrast, Levitt and Snyder (1997) find that federal spending in the USA 
benefits congressional incumbents. To obtain this outcome, they indicate that the results 
in the literature are contaminated by the fact that incumbents that have difficulties in 
being reelected are likely to exert greater effort in obtaining federal money for their 
district. However, this variable is usually omitted from the specification, which 
introduces a downward bias in the estimations. To accurately measure the impact of 
fiscal spending, they correct by means of instrumental variables. In their case, voters are 
not fiscal conservatives since they prefer more government spending. 
The case of Chile has several characteristics that make it a very interesting case 
of study. First, since the return to democracy in 1990, there have been several political 
elections in which the governing coalition (the Concertación) has been very successful.  
Second, and more importantly, while in government, the Concertación has significantly 
increased government social spending.
2 The time series data show an increasing number 
of people receiving government subsidies. Indeed, while in 1990 17.1% of the 
population received in-kind subsidies  and 10.1% received monetary subsidies, in 1998 
these figures had increased to 30.1% and 16.2%, respectively (Table 1, panel A). Finally, 
we have access to a very rich data set, which provides data on the number of people that 
receive government subsidies in each county. There is not only an important time-series 
variation in the data, but there also is a significant cross-section variation among 
counties. While there are counties where almost nobody receives subsidies, there are 
others where more than 40% do (Table 1, panel B).   
                                                           
2 Social spending includes central government spending in education, health, social security, the environment, 






% recipients in 1990 17.1 10.1 26.1
% recipients in 1992 28.3 15.4 39.4










0 - 10% 10% - 20% 20% - 30% 30% - 40% 40% - 50% 50% or more
1990 17 45 5310
1992 5 102 23 2 3 0
1998 10 112 65 10 0 0





0 - 10% 10% - 20% 20% - 30% 30% - 40% 40% - 50% 50% or more
1990 5 47 22 0 0 0
1992 2 5 49 70 12 0
1998 5 4 44 108 32 4  
Any Subsidy 0 - 10% 10% - 20% 20% - 30% 30% - 40% 40% - 50% 50% or more
1990 16 31 26 1 0 0
1992 4 3 40 72 19 0
1998 2 3 4 38 87 63  
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically whether these subsidies 
have an influence on political voting in Chile. The question to answer is whether in 
political elections Chilean voters reward direct subsidies from the government. 
The literature on economic variables and political elections in Chile has 
concentrated basically on the effects of the business cycle on electoral results.
3 Cerda 
and Vergara (2004), for instance, find that both the unemployment rate and the deviation 
of GDP from its trend have a significant effect on political voting in Chile.  
Although business cycle factors are important, they are not the only factors 
determining electoral performance. In this paper we focus on other factors that might be 
                                                           
3 Panzer and Paredes, 1991; Engel and Araos, 1989; Villena, 2003; Cerda and Vergara, 2004. The literature on 
business cycles and political elections in the US has been abundant. See Fair (1978, 1996), Kramer (1971), 
Stiegler (1975). 4  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
more manageable to the incumbent and which might allow him/her to improve his/her 
electoral performance. We focus on government social spending, and more specifically, 
on government subsidies. We concentrate on this type of government spending since it is 
related to the programs that reach individuals more directly, and, therefore, they are 
more likely to impact voters’ decisions. 
Contrary to the approach of some literature, in this paper we are not interested in 
the overall stance of fiscal policy, but just on government social spending. This is an 
important distinction since the Chilean government has been quite conservative 
regarding the overall fiscal stance. In most of the years since 1990, there has been a 
budget surplus and the government’s debt has decreased sharply since then.
4 This 
suggests that although voters might like social spending, they also realize that it has to 
be financed either by decreasing public spending in other areas and/or by increasing 
taxes.  
Government social spending has varied considerably during the last century. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of this variable as a fraction of GDP since 1905. There is a 
clear upward trend on the series, as is the case in most countries. The significant jump in 
the early 1970’s is related to the populist policies of the Allende government, while the 
one in the early 1980’s is related to the recession of 1982-83. Our paper focuses on the 
last period, starting in 1989. Between 1973 and 1988, there were no political elections 
and before 1973, we have no data on government subsidies. 
These last fifteen years have been the years that the Concertación has been in 
power. Since 1990, there has been a significant increase in government social spending. 
Between 1989 and 2003, social spending
5 increased 115% in real terms. The largest 
increases were in education (215%) and health (200%) (Figure 2). Social spending as a 
percentage of GDP increased from 13.5% in 1989 to 15% in 2003.  
 
 
                                                           
4 The net debt of the central government fell from 48% of GDP in 1989 to 11% of GDP in 2004. 
5 Social spending includes spending on education, health, social security, the environment, housing and other 
social activities. DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 294  5
Figure 1 
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Social spending has several components. The main objective of some of them is 
to attain long-run social targets–such as increasing schooling or decreasing the infant 
mortality rate-, but other parts of social spending may be due to the political scenario: in 
periods in which the incumbent faces little popular support, the government might 
expand social spending to “improve” its approval rating.  As health, education and 6  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
housing are more related to long-run objectives, we will focus on the impact of subsidies 
(monetary and in-kind subsidies), which seem more easily manageable by the presidency 
in the short run.
6 
Our dependent variable is the incumbent’s vote in presidential elections in Chile 
since 1989. We use a panel with three periods (the elections of 1989, 1993 and 1999) 
and 228 counties. We also have data on the share of people in each municipality who 
receive government subsidies, which includes monetary and in-kind subsidies. We 
investigated whether these subsidies have an impact on political elections. We also 
controlled by business cycle variables and by variables such as the poverty rate, whether 
the mayor belongs to the government’s coalition and by other demographic variables.  
We initially estimated our model using standard methods. However, we 
recognized that there might be a simultaneity problem in our exercise. In fact, while 
social spending may determine electoral performance, it might also be that an incumbent 
facing a difficult political scenario will react by increasing social spending to improve 
his/her electoral performance. Therefore, government spending can affect electoral 
performance, but, also, expected electoral performance can lead to more social spending. 
To deal with the problem, we used a 2SLS approach. As usual, the instruments should be 
correlated with subsidies but not correlated with the incumbent’s reaction to the electoral 
scenario. We used instruments related to poverty levels since they are correlated with 
subsidies (in poorer counties, a larger fraction of the population receives subsidies). On 
the other hand, poverty is exogenous to the incumbent’s reaction and, therefore, it is not 
related to electoral performance other than by aggregate economic factors that are 
already included in the electoral performance equation. Thus, those factors should be 
orthogonal to the residuals in our equation once we control by aggregate exogenous 
economic factors. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the second section, we provide an overview 
of the Chilean political environment since the return to democracy in 1990. Section three 
contains a description and an analysis of the data and the methodology as well as an 
analysis of the results. The simultaneity problem is addressed in section four. Section 
five concludes. 
 
                                                           
6 Additionally, we do not have data on overall social spending by county. DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 294  7
2.   A POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
In October 1988, after fifteen years in power, General Pinochet lost a plebiscite in 
which voters were asked whether they wanted to have the General in power for eight 
more years. The plebiscite was established in the constitution of 1980 by the military 
government itself. It was not supposed to be lost, especially considering that the 
government had a clear advantage in terms of resources and media. However, the No (to 
Pinochet) option won with 56% of the vote (Table 2). 
 
Year Candidate Votes %
1989 Votes YES 3,119,110 44.01
1989 Votes NO 3,967,569 55.99
Total 7,086,679 100.00
1989 Hernán Büchi Buc 2,052,116 29.40
1989 Francisco J. Errázuriz Talavera 1,077,172 15.43
1989 Patricio Aylwin Azócar 3,850,571 55.17
Total 6,979,859 100.00
1993 Manfred Max Neef 387,102 5.55
1993 Eugenio Pizarro Poblete 327,402 4.70
1993 Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 4,040,497 57.98
1993 Cristián Reitze Campos 81,675 1.17
1993 Arturo Alessandri Besa 1,701,324 24.41
1993 José Piñera Echeñique 430,950 6.18
Total 6,968,950 100.00
1999 1r Arturo Frei Bolívar 26,812 0.38
1999 1r Sara María Larraín Ruiz-Tagle 31,319 0.44
1999 1r Gladys Marín Millie 225,224 3.19
1999 1r Tomas Hirsch Goldschmidt 36,235 0.51
1999 1r Ricardo Lagos Escobar 3,383,339 47.96
1999 1r Joaquin Lavin Infante 3,352,199 47.51
Total 7,055,128 100.00
1999 2r Ricardo Lagos Escobar 3,683,158 51.31
1999 2r Joaquin Lavin Infante 3,495,569 48.69
Total 7,178,727 100.00
Source: Ministry of the Interior and TRICEL. Chile.
Table 2





That same constitution established that if the government’s nominee (in this case, 
Pinochet) lost the plebiscite there would be open presidential elections the year after. In 
December 1989, Mr. Patricio Aylwin, the candidate of the opposition to the government 
(the Concertación, a coalition of parties from the center and left), won the election with 8  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
55% of the vote and became the first democratically elected president since 1973. The 
government’s candidate (Mr. Hernán Büchi, a former Minister of Finance during the 
Pinochet regime) obtained 29% of the vote.
7 
Since 1989, there have been three presidential elections in Chile. All three of 
them have been won by the Concertación. In the second one, in 1994, Mr. Eduardo Frei 
won with 58% of the vote against 24% for Mr. Arturo Alessandri, the candidate of the 
center-right coalition. The third presidential election, however, was more contested. 
Indeed, in the first round, in December 1999, neither of the candidates obtained 50% of 
the vote. The Concertación candidate, Mr. Ricardo Lagos, obtained 47.96% and the 
opposition (center-right) candidate, Mr. Joaquín Lavín, obtained 47.51% of the vote. The 
rest went to smaller parties.
8 The Chilean constitution establishes a second round for 
these cases between the two first majorities. In the second round, Mr. Lagos won with 
51.3% of the vote against 48.7% for  Mr. Lavín. As documented in Cerda and Vergara 
(op.cit.), the reduction in the vote in favor of the Concertación in this election is related 
to the first recession in Chile in sixteen years. GDP fell 0.8% in 1999 and the 
unemployment rate climbed from 6.2% in 1998 to 9.7% in 1999 (Figures 3 and 4).
9  
Overall, the Concertación has done remarkably well in political elections in the 
last fifteen years. Despite the recession, it won the presidential election of 1999 (in both 
rounds
10) and  afterwards, it has won another congressional election in 2001 and a 
municipal election in 2004. 
                                                           
7 A third candidate, presented as an independent, but generally considered to be close to the center-right, 
obtained 15% of the vote. 
8 The communist candidate, Mrs. Gladys Marín, earned 3.2% of the vote. 
9 For 1989, we added up the votes for the government’s candidate and the votes for the candidate who 
presented himself as an independent (Errázuriz) although in the public opinion, he was considered closer to the 
government. 
10 The second round was in January 2000. DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 294  9
Figure 3 
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3.   DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we discuss the properties of our data set and the estimation 
possibilities at hand. We follow the literature on economic variables and electoral 
performance as we hypothesize that the electoral performance of the incumbent depends 
on two types of variables: (1) economic and (2) non-economic variables. Non-economic 
variables include variables that encompass issues such as moral values, political ideas 
and the like. Economic variables are included since the population may punish 
incumbents by not voting for them if they consider that there is a poor economic 
management of the economy. Among the variables that might influence the vote we 
include aggregate economic variables indicating the state of the economy (business cycle 
variables) and government subsidies that are spent directly on individuals. The 
difference between these two types of economic variables is that business cycle variables 
are less dependent on the incumbent’s decisions. This is more the case in small open 
economies such as Chile, in which the business cycle is more dependent on external 
factors, such as terms of trade and international interest rate shocks Nonetheless, we still 
argue that voters attribute some degree of responsibility to the incumbent for the bad 
macroeconomic performance and will punish him/her at the ballot box. Subsidies, on the 
other hand, are in part arbitrarily determined by the incumbent, and as such, might have 
a significant effect on voters’ decisions.  
 
3.1 Rough  correlations 
Since the end of the Chilean military regime, there have been several presidential, 
congressional and municipal elections. Figures 5 and 6 plot incumbents’ electoral 
performance vis-à-vis the growth rate in social spending and subsidies. Even when we 
mix in the figures the outcome of presidential, national congress and county elections, 
there is an astonishing time-series correlation between the series. In fact, the correlation 
between the series in figure 5 is 0.84 while in figure 6 it is 0.67. 
 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 294  11
Figure 5 
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 12  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
Tables 3 to 5 show the evolution of business cycle variables and electoral 
performance for each type of election.  As a measure of the Chilean business cycle, we 
include GDP growth, the inflation rate and the average unemployment rate in each year 
in which an election took place. Electoral performance is measured by the percentage of 
votes obtained by the incumbent. All three tables show an important correlation between 




Unemployment GDP Growth Inflation
1989 44.8 8.0 -1.1% 21.4
1993 58.0 6.5 0.2% 12.2











Unemployment GDP Growth Inflation
1989 36.8 8.0 -1.1% 21.4
1993 55.4 6.5 0.2% 12.2
1997 50.5 6.1 5.1% 6.0
1989 36.2 8.0 -1.1% 21.4
1993 55.5 6.5 0.2% 12.2
1997 49.9 6.1 5.1% 6.0
-89.7% 44.2% -78.5%











Unemployment GDP Growth Inflation
1992 53.3 6.7 0.4% 12.7
1996 56.1 6.5 4.1% 6.6








The data shown in these tables are obviously not conclusive regarding causality. 
Those results might also occur if the causality went from electoral performance to DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 294  13
economic variables (this hypothesis seems highly unlikely) or if there were a set of other 
variables, not included in the tables, that might determine both economic and electoral 
variables. However, the data show that there is clearly an association among aggregate 
economic variables and electoral performance. 
To look more carefully at our question of interest, we decided to analyze 
presidential elections at the Chilean county level. We do so because there is a great 
variation in electoral performance throughout the country.  Hence, we obtained a great 
variation in our data set by including the cross-sectional dimension of the data.  In fact, 
from Table 6, which shows descriptive statistics of electoral performance by region, we 
may conclude that there is a great variation in the data between and within regions and 
over time in a given region.  We decided to focus on presidential elections rather than on 
congressional elections or municipal elections because those representatives do not have 
the same power as the president to determine economic policies. Hence, it is more likely 
that people will evaluate economic policies in presidential elections.  
 
3.2   Data and preliminary results 
Our dependent variable is the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent at 
the county level in presidential elections since 1989 in Chile. We obtained these data 
from the Chilean electoral service (Servicio Electoral de Chile). There are 228 counties 
in our data set. We also obtained data on different variables of interest that might explain 
the electoral performance according to the 1990, 1992 and 1998 Surveys of 
Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Chilean Population (CASEN). These data 
correspond to a representative survey of the Chilean population. The Survey includes 
approximately 200,000 individual data per year.  Using this survey, we obtained the 
explanatory variables by county. The CASEN survey allows us to extract the following 
candidates as explanatory variables: (1) variables related to demographics, such as the 
average age of voters and the fraction of female voters; (2) the fraction of the population 
under the poverty line; (3) the unemployment rate; and (4) government subsidies.   14  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
Region Year Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
1989 10 48.86 12.47 30.22 66.46
1993 10 46.00 10.59 25.80 58.98
1999 10 38.89 12.66 15.33 51.41
1989 9 27.89 6.36 21.47 39.53
1993 9 56.94 5.97 47.79 66.87
1999 9 59.13 4.68 53.48 65.22
1989 9 31.69 6.86 19.95 46.86
1993 9 59.61 3.44 53.03 63.33
1999 9 60.90 4.86 53.24 70.68
1989 15 31.74 9.63 21.14 54.04
1993 15 62.56 4.68 54.82 71.86
1999 15 62.11 9.50 47.60 78.29
1989 37 31.91 9.02 19.52 61.92
1993 37 59.63 6.72 46.22 71.09
1999 38 a/ 48.64 7.67 34.70 62.72
1989 33 31.35 5.15 20.75 42.31
1993 33 64.48 3.94 55.22 71.14
1999 33 51.76 4.56 42.94 62.51
1989 29 30.47 5.28 21.50 42.89
1993 29 60.64 6.17 42.85 71.26
1999 30 b/ 50.55 7.41 37.44 62.21
1989 49 30.02 10.05 10.69 54.72
1993 49 61.57 6.36 48.17 74.80
1999 52 c/ 51.11 11.14 26.71 73.04
1989 30 31.50 9.07 19.54 59.75
1993 30 54.08 7.88 37.08 67.54
1999 31 d/ 40.68 8.01 23.35 56.84
1989 42 33.69 8.57 19.12 56.74
1993 42 54.48 6.75 35.49 65.39
1999 42 44.38 8.42 24.45 60.05
1989 10 44.10 15.24 25.09 76.43
1993 10 52.09 3.77 46.17 55.51
1999 10 40.97 9.17 22.95 54.31
1989 11 46.77 19.28 27.55 86.67
1993 11 55.64 13.42 31.43 67.16
1999 11 44.93 14.97 13.33 59.73
1989 51 32.07 8.78 20.12 63.38
1993 51 58.68 8.25 29.40 69.66
1999 52 e/ 50.48 8.23 24.10 61.66
a/ It includes "Con Con" county
b/ It includes "San Rafael" county
c/ It includes the following counties: "Chiguayante," "Chillan Viejo" and "Sn. Pedro de la Paz"
d/ It includes "Padre Las Casas" county
e/ It includes "Padre Hurtado" county
Source: Servicio Electoral de Chile
VII
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It is not possible to obtain from the CASEN survey other economic variables of 
interest at the county level, such as GDP growth rate or the inflation rate. To deal with 
this issue, we obtained data on GDP by Chilean regions from the National Accounts. 
However, there are no inflation rate data, not even by region. Thus, as variables 
measuring economic performance, we include the unemployment rate at the county level 
and a measure of output gap at the regional level, where output gap is the deviation of 
GDP from its trend (measured by means of the Hoddrick-Prescott filter).  
The CASEN survey contains questions concerning direct subsidies to individuals. 
These are monetary and in-kind subsidies. Monetary subsidies include government 
payment directly to specific individuals. These subsidies are received by: (i) the elderly, 
the mentally disabled and physically disabled individuals; (ii) pregnant women and 
women with a newborn in the household; (iii) unemployed household heads. There are 
other monetary subsidies, but the amount they provide is almost insignificant as 
compared to the ones just described. In-kind subsidies are received by: (i) grade and high 
school students receiving free breakfasts and lunches at school and free textbooks for 
school use; (ii) grade and high school students receiving medical and dental care at 
schools; (iii) households receiving free food (mainly milk) and medicines.  
For our purposes, the “subsidy” variable is measured as the fraction of the 
population in each county receiving any of these subsidies. An alternative would be to 
use the per-capita amount of subsidies received in every county per year. Unfortunately, 
for some subsidies (especially in-kind subsidies), we do not have data on the amounts 
involved.  
Figures 7 to 9 plot the fraction of inhabitants receiving in-kind subsidies in each 
of the 13 Chilean regions for different years. In these figures, each point represents a 
county. It is possible to conclude that people receiving in-kind subsidies have increased 
considerably over time, but also that some regions have experienced greater increases 
than others.  The greatest increases have occurred in regions 2 to 4. Compared to table 6, 
these are the regions with the greatest increase in the vote obtained by the incumbent 
over time. 16  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
Figure 7 
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Figure 9 







































To control for other political considerations, we obtained, from the Chilean 
electoral service, the political party of the mayor in office. We constructed an indicator 
function that assumes the value one when the mayor belongs to the same political 
coalition as the presidential incumbent, and a value of zero otherwise. In theory, a mayor 
from the same coalition as the presidential incumbent might help him/her earn more 
votes in the county.  
To proceed with the econometric analysis, we hypothesized the following 
relationship: 
 
(1)  0 '' it it it i t it VX Z v α βγ µ λ =+ + ++ +  
 
Where the subscripts indicate the i
th county and the t
th year. The variable  it V  is the 
incumbent´s electoral performance while Xit is a set of economic variables (including 
aggregate business cycle variables and subsidies) and Zit is the set of other non-economic 
variables determining  it V . In Zit, we include demographics plus other political variables 18  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
that might influence people´s vote.  Finally,  i µ   is a county-fixed effect,  t λ is a time-
fixed effect
11 and  it v is a well-behaved error term distributed 
2 (0, ) v iid σ .  
As explanatory variables, we include subsidies, the unemployment rate and the 
square of the unemployment rate to capture a potential non-linear effect of this variable. 
We expect the overall impact of the unemployment rate to be negative, but possibly the 
squared term will be positive, which would capture a non-linear effect that indicates that 
the marginal effect declines as the unemployment rate increases. We also included 
demographic variables, time-effects, the output gap, the fraction of the population in 
poverty and the mayor’s political affiliation. 
We initially estimated our panel data using a random-effect GLS method. 
However, the Hausman test was rejected in all the specifications, denoting a rejection of 
the hypothesis of orthogonality between the county-fixed effect and the explanatory 
variables. Hence, we estimated a fixed-effects model (Table 7). Column 1 of Table 7 
shows the results when we do not control by other variables except for the time-fixed 
effects. Subsidies are positive and statistically significant, indicating the larger the 
percentage of the population that receives the subsidy, the higher the vote for the 
incumbent. The unemployment rate appears with the expected sign and it is statistically 
significant. Columns 2 to 5 provide the sensitivity analysis as we introduce other 
variables.   
The estimated coefficient of subsidies does not vary considerably as we include 
more explanatory variables in the benchmark equation. Regarding the business cycle 
variables, our results indicate that the higher the rate of unemployment, the lower the 
vote of the incumbent. The relationship is not linear since the effect declines as the 
unemployment rate increases. The output gap also has the expected sign and it is 
statistically significant.  
 
                                                            
11 We include the time-fixed effect as it might allow the capture of the impact of aggregate determinants that 
do not vary across counties but that do influence electoral performance--such as the inflation rate. While the 
inflation rate in Chile was 21% in 1989, it fell gradually over the next decade, reaching 2.3% in 1999. This 
time variable can also be thought to be controlling by the quality of the candidates. For instance, it has been 
argued in Chile that the increase in the vote for the opposition in the 1999 election was also related to a better 
opposition candidate in that election. 
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Table 7 
FE effect estimation 
 
Dependent variable: electoral votes, %, by county 

































Demographics No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Mayor       6.58** 
(3.40) 
Time-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  Overall  0.4952 0.5092 0.5113 0.5092 0.5638 
Within  0.7610 0.7615 0.7698 0.7699 0.7867 
Between  0.1280 0.1457 0.1414 0.1389 0.2387 
       
Observations 384 384 384 384 384 
Groups  228 228 228 228 228 
Demographics include average age and fraction of females. T statistics in parenthesis. 




The political party of the mayor appears to have a significant effect on the vote in 
presidential elections. If the mayor belongs to the coalition of the incumbent, then there 
is a positive effect on the vote for the candidate of the government’s coalition in that 
county. Poverty, on the other hand, is not statistically significant. 
We tried several lags for the different variables, but they were not statistically  
significant. This supports the idea that the economic events that influence political 
elections are current events rather than lagged events.
12 
                                                            
12 For this case, we assumed that current events are those that happen in the year of the election or in the year 
before the election, the reason being that we do not have all the required data for the election year (since the 
CASEN survey is not performed every year). 20  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
4.   POTENTIAL SIMULTANEITY 
The results reported above provide consistent evidence under different 
specifications and estimation methods of the impact of subsidies on an incumbent’s 
electoral performance. However, it is likely that the estimated coefficient is downward-
biased. In fact, as people determine their votes in terms of the subsidies they receive, the 
incumbent might react to this decision. Hence, in an election in which the incumbent 
forecasts a difficult reelection, he/she might increase subsidies to increase his/her 
possibilities.  
It is possible to think of the following simultaneous model: 
 
(2)  it it it it VX S u βγ =+ +  
(3)  it it it it SZ V δ αε =++  
 
where γ>0, α<0. In the above model, Xit and Zit are exogenous single-valued variables 
that might determine either electoral performance (Vit) or subsidies (Sit) in order to keep 
the model as simple as possible. Furthermore, uit and εit are iid random variables with a 
mean of zero and a variance of 
2
u σ  and 
2
ε σ , respectively. Then, note that if we estimate 
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A direct estimation of equation (2) biases downward our estimation of β, our 
parameter of interest. It therefore follows that our estimation of equation (1) might be 
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To address this problem, we estimated equation (1) using a 2SLS fixed-effect 
panel regression, explaining subsidies in the first stage. In this estimation, the key 
element is choosing the instruments (IV). As usual, our IV should be correlated with 
subsidies, but uncorrelated with the residual in equation (1).  Hence, the set of 
instruments to be used must influence subsidies, but should not be correlated with the 
incumbent’s reaction to the electoral scenario. To determine this IV, we hypothesized 
that subsidies depended on: (a) specific rules and (b) arbitrary decisions by the 
incumbent. The first set of variable is exogenous to the incumbent and, therefore, should 
resolve the simultaneity problem.  
In Chile, subsidies are directed to the poor. For instance, the school meal program 
is targeted towards students attending public (or semi-public) schools that can be 
classified as high-risk. High risk is a condition defined by the Chilean government as a 
combination of variables such as household income and students’ weight and height. It is 
supposed to indicate students with low human capital. High-risk students come from 
poor households. Poor people go to public schools where they receive these subsidies. 
Similarly, the free textbook program is directed only to students at public schools. Since 
one of the determinants of high risk is income, two candidates to be used as instrumental 
variables are the fraction of population in each county that is in the first two deciles of 
the income distribution and the average income in each county.  
 Figure 10 confirms this relationship between poverty and the percentage of the 
population receiving subsidies. Each panel of this Figure plots average income (per 
county) vis-à-vis the fraction of the population receiving subsidies for different years. As 
it is clear from the figure, there is a negative non-linear relationship. The different panels 
of Figure 11 plot the fraction of the population in the first and second deciles of income 
vis-à-vis the fraction of the population receiving subsidies for different years. As 
expected, they show a clear positive relationship. . 
Thus, income and the fraction of population in the first and second deciles of the 
income distribution will be used as our instrumental variables in the fixed-effects 
equations. As the relationship in the graphs seems to be non-linear, we will also use the 
square of these variables as instruments. 
Table 8 reports the results of our estimations as we use IV. Part (a) of this table 
shows the first-stage regressions while part (b) shows the second-stage regressions.  The 
first-stage regressions confirm our idea that the instruments are not weak, while part (b) 22  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
of the table shows that, with the exception of subsidies, the coefficients of our variables 
of interest in equation (1) almost do not vary as we use IV. In the case of subsidies, the 
coefficient increases considerably, multiplyed by a factor of between two and three, 
which confirms that the simultaneity problem caused a downward bias in its coefficient.  
Our results also confirm the importance of the unemployment rate. The average 
unemployment rate in the Chilean economy in 1989-2003 has been 8%. Our results 
(from equation 5 in Table 8) predict that if the unemployment rate were to increase from 
8% to 9%, the incumbent’s vote would decline by 1.1 percentage points. The coefficient 
of the output gap is positive and statistically significant, indicating that if actual output is 
above its trend, the better the performance of the incumbent will be in presidential 
elections. 
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Figure 10 
Plots of in-kind subsidies vis-à-vis average income by years 
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Figure 11 
Plots of in-kind subsidies vis-à-vis population in 1
st and 2
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Table 8 
 2SLS - FE estimation 
 (a) First - Stage Regression 
 
Dependent variable: subsidies, %, by county 
  Equation 1  Equation 2  Equation 3  Equation 4  Equation 5 






































































Demographics  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 










M a y o r        
Time-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R2  Overall  0.8124 0.7466 0.7449 0.7400 0.7432 
Within  0.7529 0.7681 0.7709 0.7712 0.7754 
Between  0.7810 0.7128 0.7073 0.7017 0.7050 
       
Observations  380 380 380 380 380 
Groups  227 227 227 227 227 
 
(b) Second – Stage Regression 
Dependent variable: electoral votes, %, by county 



































Demographics  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Mayor       5.65** 
(2.73) 
Time-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  Overall  0.4450 0.4614 0.4650 0.4626 0.5278 
Within  0.7494 0.7439 0.7507 0.7515 0.7673 
Between  0.1078 0.1244 0.1233 0.1195 0.1977 
Observations  380 380 380 380 380 
Groups  227 227 227 227 227 
Demographics include average age and fraction of females. T statistics in parenthesis. 
** indicates significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 26  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
We next decided to separate government  subsidies into in-kind subsidies and 
monetary subsidies, as we would like to know if people react differently to the different 
types of subsidies. We made, as per above, two estimations: FE and IV-FE estimation.  
Table 9 reports the FE results while table 10 reports the IV-FE results. 
The results are quite similar to the ones obtained above. However, the coefficient 
of both types of subsidies differs considerably, the one on monetary subsidies being 
statistically not significant while the one related to in-kind statistics was positive and 
statistically significant. The result seen for monetary subsidies (that are statistically  not 
significant) might be explained because those types of subsidies are highly regulated 
and, therefore, the incumbent has less power to unilaterally increase their amount. 
Indeed, monetary subsidies are more focalized in the sense that they reach specific 
segments of the population (the very poor, the elderly and the disabled). As these 
benefits are taken for granted, they should not influence voters’ behavior. In addition, it 
is likely that a large proportion of the people who receive monetary subsidies do not vote 
in political elections (as a significant fraction is either old or disabled). We therefore 
suspect that voters do not evaluate their political authorities on this ground.  
In-kind subsidies, on the other hand, reach a larger fraction of the population than 
monetary subsidies. For instance, the school meal program reaches 33% of the school 
students in the country.
13 This implies that it reaches a large fraction of the families and 
of the voters. The same is true for the food program for small children in health care 
institutions. In fact, 30.1% of the population receives at least one of the in-kind subsidies 
available while only 16.2% of the population receives monetary subsidies. Furthermore, 
the percentage of the population that receives in-kind subsidies have increased by 
thirteen percentage points in the last decade while the percentage of the population that 
receives monetary subsidies has increased by only six percentage points in the same 
period. 
Thus, the evidence for Chile in this period suggests that the vote is more linked to 
in-kind subsidies. The results of Table 10 indicate that the percentage of the population 
receiving in-kind subsidies between the elections of 1993 and 1999 increased the vote 
                                                           
13 As schools usually complement the government subsidy, the amount of the benefit perceived by the 
beneficiary is greater than the direct government subsidy. This is not the case for monetary subsidies. Hence, 
the difference in cost for the government of both types of subsidies underestimates the real difference 
perceived by the beneficiaries. DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 294  27
for the incumbent by 2 percentage points. Hence, this was an important factor in the 
1999 election and it offset, to some degree, the effect of the recession of that year. 
 
Table 9 
FE effect estimation 
 
Dependent variable: electoral votes, %, by county 













































Demographics No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Mayor       6.69** 
(3.45) 
Time-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  Overall  0.4663 0.4860 0.4920 0.4886 0.5521 
Within  0.7610 0.7616 0.7704 0.7706 0.7880 
Between  0.0977 0.1111 0.1110 0.1074 0.2049 
       
Observations  384 384 384 384 384 
Groups  228 228 228 228 228 
 
Demographics include average age and fraction of females. T statistics in parenthesis. 
** indicates significant at 5% and * significant at 10% 
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Table 10 
2SLS - FE estimation 
 
Dependent variable: electoral votes, %, by county 













































Demographics No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 










Mayor         6.91** 
(2.94) 
Time-effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 Overall  0.3434  0.3476  0.3564  0.3622  0.4251 
Within 0.7138  0.6645  0.6752  0.6896  0.7207 
Between 0.0638  0.0713  0.0719  0.0711  0.1202 
          
Observations 380  380  380  380  380 
Groups 227  227  227  227  227 
Demographics include average age and fraction of females. T statistics in parenthesis. 






5.   CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper has been to investigate the effect of government 
subsidies on voters’ decisions in presidential elections in Chile during the period 1989-
2000. Our results indicate that government subsidies have a positive effect on the votes 
obtained by the incumbent.  
We face a potential endogenous problem. Indeed, while subsidies may determine 
electoral performance, the expected electoral performance may also influence the 
amount of subsidies granted by the government in power. This effect produces a 
downward bias in the coefficient of this variable. To correct for this endogenicity, we 
use 2SLS.  As instrumental variables, we use the average real income of the county and 
the percentage of the population of the county in the first two deciles of the income 
distribution. Both are related to subsidies, as relatively poorer counties receive greater DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 294  29
benefits, but they are not related to electoral performance other than by aggregate 
economic factors that are also included in the electoral performance equation. The 
coefficient for government subsidies remains positive and significant, but it is much 
larger than without correcting for endogenicity, confirming the downward bias that is 
introduced by not correcting for this effect. 
When separating in-kind and monetary subsidies, we find that only in-kind 
subsidies appear to influence voters. One possible explanation for this asymmetry is that 
in Chile, monetary subsidies are more focalized in the sense that they reach a specific 
segment of the population (the very poor, the elderly and the disabled). These benefits 
are taken for granted by these people. They are viewed as more dependent on objective 
variables, and as such, less dependent on government decisions.  Hence, they should not 
influence voters’ behavior. In addition, it is likely that a large proportion of the people 
who receive monetary subsidies do not vote in political elections (as a significant 
fraction is either old or disabled). Furthermore, in-kind subsidies reach a much larger 
proportion of the population than monetary subsidies.  
We also conclude that the business cycle, and specifically, the unemployment 
rate, have a significant effect on the votes earned by the incumbent. These results allow 
us to estimate that the worsening of the economic conditions between the presidential 
elections of 1993 and 1999 reduced the vote for the incumbent while the increase in 
government in-kind subsidies partially offset this effect. 
Our estimations also indicate that demographics variables as well as the political 
party of the mayor have an influence on the vote. 
How much does a vote cost the incumbent? The results from Table 10 indicate 
that an incumbent willing to increase his/her electoral performance by 1 percentage point 
should increase the fraction of the population receiving in-kind subsidies between 1.3 
and 1.5 percentage points. For instance, a reasonable expenditure in the food program is 
around US$300 per person a year. Therefore, in a population of 15 million people, the 
government should provide free food to between 195,000 and 225,000 more people at a 
cost of between US$58.5 million and US$67.5 million. For a vote of about 7 million 
cast, this means that each vote costs between  US$840 and US$960. If we correct by the 
PPP, this is equivalent to between US$1,680 and US$1,920 in the USA. This figure is 
much lower than the US$14,000 that Levitt and Snyder (op.cit) found that a vote for the 
House of Representatives cost in the USA. 30  GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND POLITICAL ELECTIONS 
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